The current financial crisis hit the banking giants of the world really hard. It is striking to note that some of the large Chinese commercial banks have emerged to be the biggest winners as a result of the crisis thanks to reforms over the last 10 years. The most significant reform before the crisis was ownership diversification, aiming to improve corporate governance and efficiency. Within one year from October 2005, three of the four biggest state-owned banks (SOBs) were listed on the stock exchanges. This paper will study whether this reform has really improved bank efficiency. Adopting the DEA (data envelopment analysis) approach, this paper examines whether IPO (initial public offering) is effective in enhancing bank performance. Using data of 14 listed banks during 1999-07, the results show that on average, bank efficiency increased by almost 10% after listing. Despite joint equity banks (JEBs) still perform better than SOBs, the latter manage to catch up and reduce the efficiency gap with the former during the past few years. This in part explains why the Chinese banking system has been less affected by the current world financial crisis than their western counterparts, leading to an important conclusion that SOB reforms in China over the last 10 years have produced remarkable results.
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Non-technical Summary
The current financial crisis hit some world banking giants really hard. For example, share prices of Citigroup and the Royal Bank of Scotland tumbled by more than 95% from 2007 to January 2009. It is striking to note that China's largest commercial banks emerged to become the biggest winners as a result of the crisis thanks to reforms over the last 10 years. In 2008, three listed Chinese state-owned banks (SOBs), Industry and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Bank of China (BOC) and China Construction Bank (CCB) had replaced their American and European counterparts to be the world's three largest commercial banks in market value and profitability after they were listed on the stock exchanges only two years earlier.
This dramatic development triggered our research curiosity as to why the Chinese commercial banks managed to avoid destruction by the world financial crisis and whether their efficiency had indeed been enhanced after a series of reforms. The most significant effort before the crisis was ownership diversification, aiming to improve corporate governance and performance. Within one year from October 2005, three of the four SOBs were listed on the stock exchanges successfully. To address this issue, this paper adopts the DEA (data envelopment analysis) approach to examine whether IPO (initial public offering) is effective in enhancing bank performance.
Employing data of 14 listed banks during 1999-07, DEA results using different estimation techniques with alternative assumptions provide potent evidence that banking efficiency in China has been improved after stock listing. Information related to these listed banks is more readily available to investors and thus subjecting them to increased pressure of public scrutiny. The average efficiency of the sample banks was improved by 10% over the data period measured by the CRS (constant return to scale) super-efficiency approach. IPO not only improves efficiency by imposing a hard-budget constraint on bank operations as after listing the state will not be obliged to bail out failing banks, but also helps banks to realize their scale economy through raising capital from investors. Despite joint equity banks (JEBs) still perform better than SOBs, the latter manage to catch up and reduce the efficiency gap with the former during the past few years. This in part explains why the Chinese banking system has been less affected by the current world financial crisis.
Introduction
The world financial crisis reduced some world banking giants, such as Citigroup and Royal Banks of Scotland to ashes as their share prices tumbled by more than 95% from 2007 to January 2009. In the meantime, China's three large state-owned commercial banks replaced the American and European giants to become the three largest commercial banks in the world in market capitalisation by early 2009 after they were listed on the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges only two years earlier (Table 1 , for detailed information, see Appendix III). This dramatic development triggered our research curiosity as to why the Chinese commercial banks managed to avoid destruction by the world financial crisis and emerged to become the biggest winners in the world banking system as a result of the crisis.
The answer to this question comes from China's banking reforms that were conducted from 1998 in preparation for China to join the WTO (World Trade Organisation) and the post-WTO years (from 2001) to face competition of foreign banks entering into China. Along with China's comprehensive economic reform from 1978, the Chinese banking system has experienced tremendous structural transformations and fundamental changes. The banking system in China has evolved from a monopolistic state agent to one with more than a hundred commercial banks, urban cooperatives and financial institutions coexisting in the market. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the process of bank reform and evaluates the performance of the Chinese banking system. Section 3 reviews the literature on bank efficiency studies. Section 4 describes the research methodologies. Section 5 discusses the data and presents modelling results. Section 6 concludes and discusses policy implications.
Development of the Chinese Banking System
Chinese Banking System Reform
In 1949, the establishment of the People's Bank of China (PBOC) represented the beginning of China's contemporary banking system. For almost 30 years, the Chinese financial system was totally dominated by one single bank, the People's Bank of China (PBOC), which played a dual role of policy lending and commercial operation.
Since economic reforms in 1978, the banking sector has experienced fundamental structural changes. The reform process could be divided into four stages.
The initial banking reform period of 1979-1985 saw the establishment of a two-tiered banking system, in which the commercial operation of PBOC was replaced by four 3 specialized banks, namely, the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the CCB, the ICBC, and the BOC. These specialized banks were the lending mechanism of the government, through which financial support was provided to SOEs. In order to fulfil the regional production and construction plans, the banks progressively accumulated huge amount of NPLs due to poor performance of SOEs. Moreover, these four specialized banks retained a monopoly power over specific sectors, contradicting the nation's original goal of marketisation. As a result, restrictions on bank operation were removed in 1985. restructuring of some urban cooperatives into city commercial banks, the establishment of four Asset Management Companies (AMCs) and the first round of NPL disposal. In order to compensate the "Big Four" for more than two decades of policy lending and restore their financial health, the four AMCs were established to take over their NPLs. In 1999, 1.4 trillion RMB NPLs from the "Big Four" were disposed, which was almost equivalent to 20% of China's GDP in the same year.
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The final step of the banking reform began after China's entry into the WTO. The
NPLs of the "Big Four" were further stripped off ( (Table 3) .
With a healthier balance sheet, Chinese SOBs began to be listed on the stock market.
On October 20, 2005, the CCB was listed on HKSE, raising approximately $8 billion.
This was followed by the BOC and the ICBC in 2006. The IPO of ICBC raised $21.9 billion and set a new world record, surpassing the $18.4 billion record set by Japan's NTT Mobile Communications Network Inc. in 1998 (Mitchell, 2006) . This period also saw the listing of several joint-equity banks. By the end of 2006, the aggregated weighting of the banking sector was about half of the overall SSE Composite Index and they jointly exerted strong impact over the whole financial market (Yao et al., 2008 
Current Performance of the Chinese Banking Sector
After a series of state supports, the amount of NPLs of the SOBs decreased significantly in recent years. By December 2008, the NPLs/total loans ratio of the SOBs was reduced to 2.81% (Table 4 ; Yao et al., 2004) . The same ratio of JEBs also decreased sharply to 1.51%, indicating that all Chinese commercial banks had improved their risk management and credit control abilities. In addition, the profitability of the major Chinese commercial banks had also improved. Although they rely heavily on interest incomes, the ratios of return on equity (ROE) and return on asset ( when it suffered tremendous losses in its US sub-prime related investment while ICBC managed to realize 65% rise in its net profit (Leow, 2008) . Under the pressure of increased globalisation, banks not only need to expand their income generating operations in future, but more importantly, their risk resistance ability needs to be further strengthened.
Literature of Bank Efficiency
Scale and Scope Economies
The basic concept of "efficiency" could be explained as the ratio of output (goods and services) to input resources under certain conditions. In the banking environment, most of the earlier studies were focused on scale and scope economies (Yao et al, 2007) . Economy of scale relates to firm size, and can be realized when the average costs decline as output rises while scope economy deals with efficiencies from joint production. Empirical studies of scale economy generally agreed that average cost could be minimized by medium-sized banks with asset ranging between $100 million and $300 million (Berger et al. 1993; Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Berger and Humphrey 1991; Altunbas and Molyneux, 1996) . However, this range could be increased substantially to between $2 billion and $10 billion if only bigger US banks were included in the model (Hunter et al., 1990; Noulas et al., 1990; Hunter, 1995) . This could be best illustrated by the merger and acquisition between some huge UK commercial banks, like the Royal Banks of Scotland and the National Westminster Bank, and the Bank of Scotland with Halifax. For the scope economy, despite it was believed that joint production could cut off repeated investments, and hence increase bank efficiency; results of prior literatures were ambiguous (Gilligan et al., 1984; Lawrence and Shay, 1986; Mester, 1987; Edirisuriya and Brien, 2001 ).
More recently, research has shifted to frontier efficiency studies. The concept of cost efficiency, first introduced by Leibenstein (1966) , was not widely applied to the financial institutions until the late 1980s. Berger and Humphrey (1991) argued that instead of spending effort to realize some optimal level of scale and scope economies, banks could improve their cost efficiency more easily by simply reducing frontier inefficiencies. Later literatures supported their conclusion and confirmed that Xefficiency differences across banks were actually larger and dominated scale and scope economies, which accounted for about 20% of bank costs, while the other two diseconomies only took 5% of total costs (Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Hunter and Timme, 1986, 1991) .
Concepts of X-Efficiency and Frontier Methods of Measurement
In the banking industry, the cost or input X-efficiency refers to the deviations from the cost frontier, where the banks output bundle is produced at the minimum cost for given input prices. 2 It can then be further divided into two components-technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE). The former one refers to the ability to achieve optimal utilization of all available resources either by producing maximum output for a given input mix or by using minimum inputs to produce a given output while the latter one refers to the ability to achieve the optimal combination of inputs and outputs facing fixed prices (Lovell, 1993; Yao et al. 2007) . Figure 1 depicts the relationships among the overall efficiency, TE and AE. Thus the point C has the combination of input levels which can deliver a unit of output at the lowest aggregate cost feasible. If unit R were to become technically efficient, it would operate at Q. OQ/OR is therefore the technical input efficiency. As the aggregate cost of the inputs at Q can be lowered at P, OP/OQ is the allocative efficiency of unit R. The overall efficiency of unit R is OP/OR and it can be deduced that under constant return to scale (CRS); 
That is, cost efficiency (CE) is a product of allocative efficiency (AE), SE and technical efficiency (TE).
There are five approaches, namely, stochastic frontier approach (SFA), distributionfree approach (DFA), thick frontier approach (TFA), DEA and free disposal hull (FDH) to measure a bank's X-efficiency. Due to the assumptions imposed on the sample data in areas like the functional form of the best-practice frontier, the treatment of the error terms and the distributions assumed for inefficiency and random errors, the first three methods were classified as parametric, while the others were non-parametric methods. These frontier measurements are believed to be superior to those financial ratio indicators because the numerical efficiency ratings and the ranking of the firms estimated by them are more comprehensive and objective (Cooper, 2007) .
Literature of X-efficiency Studies
Summarizing the previous frontier efficiency studies, average efficiency scores of 88%-94% for the US banks, about 85% for the developed economies, 76%-82% for the EU banks and around 68% for the emerging markets were usually identified (Fu and Heffernan, 2007) . Normally, these studies were focused on three aspects, the comparison of private, foreign and public ownership (Weill, 2003; Kraft and Tirtiroglu, 1998; Taci and Zampieri, 1998; Opiela, 2000; Hasan and Marton, 2003) ; the effects of mergers and acquisitions (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Rhode, 1993; Shaffer, 1992) , and the influence of foreign entry and deregulation (Unite and Sullivan, 2003; Chen, 2001; Claessens et al, 2001; Hao, 2001 ).
For the ownership structure of banks, it had been argued that privatization was an effective way to improve corporate governance, increase bank competition and to realize an optimal allocation of scarce financial resources. One specific form of such private ownership, foreign control was particularly welcomed by the Chinese reformers because it not only had the merit of private ownership but also had other advantages, such as sharing their know-how in organization as well. However, contrary to the above theoretical rational in favor of private ownership and foreign control, results from prior studies were ambiguous (Weill, 2003; Opiela, 2000; Hasan and Marton, 2003; Sturm and Williams, 2004; Borovicka, 2007; Mahajan et al. 1996; Chang et al., 1998; DeYong and Nolle, 1996; Berger et al., 2000) . Such inconsistency was explained as the result of the excessive cost incurred when foreign banks combine their own management pattern with local banks or due to their inability to integrate into the local markets.
The effect of merger and acquisition on bank efficiency (M&A) has drawn attention of scholars since the 1980s when a large M&A wave among the US banks started.
Earlier studies based on the 1980s data identified little improvement, around 5% after consolidation (Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Peristiani, 1997; Rhoades, 1993) while later studies employing 1990s data showed significant positive effect (Rhoades, 1998; DeToung, 1997; Akhavein, et al., 1997; Berger and Mester, 1999) . Results outside the US were also mixed. Efficiency outcomes could be heavily influenced by the specific characteristics of the merged banks and also the economic environment of the country during particular periods (Lin, 2005; Resti, 1998; Avkiran, 1999; Drake and Hall, 2003) Efficiency studies of financial liberalization and deregulation generally confirmed obvious positive effects, except for the European market (Berg et al., 1992; Zaim, 1995; Canhoto and Dermine's, 2003; Girardone et al., 2004; Sturm and Williams, 2004; Casu and Philip, 2003; Caus and Girardone, 2004) . After extensive integration and EU legislative harmonization processes, their impacts on European bank efficiency were still not clear-cut.
Recently, some researchers began to compare the efficiency among different nations or to test the consistency among different frontier measurement methods (Pastor et al., 1997; Bos and Kolari, 2005; Berg et al., 1993; Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Bauer et al., 1998; Weill, 2004) . Employing data of 683 US banks, study of Bauer et al. (1998) reported consistent efficiency scores, best performance identities and banking rankings generated by either parametric or non-parametric approaches. However, outcomes between the two groups were not mutually consistent, with much lower efficiency scores estimated by DEA.
Apart from all those studies done on the US or European banks, efficiency studies of the emerging economies, especially China have become increasingly popular. Early works mainly focused on analysing the process of banking reform, the relationships between banks' performance and foreign banks participation and factors that attract foreign banks' investment. However, most of them were published in Chinese and were unavailable to foreign scholars. Within the limited number of publicly accessible literatures, later efficiency studies using frontier techniques normally concluded that the overall efficiency of the Chinese commercial banks had been enhanced substantially after reforms and in general, JEBs were more efficient than their stateowned counterparts (Berger et al., 2005; Chen et al. 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2007; Yao et al. 2007 ).
For example, Using DEA, most of the studies were able to confirm that the Chinese commercial banks were mainly DEA inefficient. The technical efficiency of the JEBs were 10-20% higher than the SOBs (Wei and Wang, 2001; Zheng and Zhang, 2004; Li and He; 2005; Zhao et al., 2002; , except Chen et al. (2005) claimed that the performance of the SOBs were superior after deregulation.
Studies also found that the inefficiency of the JEBs were mainly because of failing to realize scale efficiency, while for the SOBs, PTE accounts for a bigger percentage.
Later studies employing parametric method-SFA generally supported the above findings and some of them further analyzed the factors that influence bank efficiency, like ownership structure, ratio of equity to total asset, etc. (Yao et al., 2004; Yao et al., 2007; Qian, 2003; Zhang and Cao, 2005; Wang and Tan, 2007) .
As IPOs of Chinese commercial banks have only become popular in recent years, few studies have analyzed the effect of listing on banks efficiency. In Liu and Song's (2004) study, they concluded that within those joint-equity banks, listed banks, such as China Merchant Bank (CMB) and Pudong Development Bank (PDB), had a higher than average efficiency score. However, they did not track the efficiency change of a particular bank before and after its listing due to data constraints, and were unable to say whether the IPO was an effective way of improving banks efficiency. Employing panel data of 14 listed banks over 1999-2007, this paper aims to overcome this obstacle and to provide some evidence on stock listing and efficiency enhancement.
Methodologies and Data Description
Since the beginning of the frontier efficiency study, the debate over the best efficiency measurement methods has never stopped. The parametric approaches presupposed the shape of the frontier, making it hard to divide the estimated inefficiency from specification errors. The non-parametric methods which eliminate the influence of random errors are also subject to criticism. In empirical work, researchers normally choose a particular approach based on the characteristics of data. In this study, we would apply the non-parametric approach, DEA as it imposes fewer requirements on the input and output variables.
Data Envelopment Analysis-DEA
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) One problem of equation (3) is that the solution it generated is infinite. Charnes et al. (1978) (1984) improved the original model and make the evaluation of the returns-to-scale effect possible. In our study, we will apply both of the CCR and BCC model to get a more objective measure of bank efficiency.
Measurement of Super Efficiency
One weakness of DEA is that it could grant many DMUs the highest level of efficiency simultaneously. The size of the sample is not large enough compared with the number of input and output variables. Andersen and Petersen (1993 and I 2 are two different inputs. Take DMU C as an example, when we use the superefficiency model to estimate its efficiency score, C itself will be excluded by the reference set and its efficiency score is represented by the ratio: TEc= OC'/OC 1. It means that the efficient DMU C could expand its input by TEc and still be efficient in the whole sample. Therefore, the bigger the TEc score assessed by the superefficiency model, the more efficient the DMU is.
≥
Existing studies on Chinese banks show that several JEBs and SOBs could be ranked as fully efficient simultaneously in one sample (Zheng and Cao, 2005; Wei and Wang, 2000) . In order to assess the effect of stock listing more precisely by different estimated efficiency scores, this study will run the super-efficiency model after the CCR and BBC models.
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Data and Results
Data
Measuring bank outputs and inputs is one of the most difficult and controversial areas in efficiency study. Unlike manufacturing firms producing physical goods, banks provide both intermediary services and a wide range of financial products. Two different approaches, production and intermediation, have been widely used in the literature.
The production approach assumes that profit maximization is banks' key objective. Therefore, the number and type of transactions and related documents is the best output measure while inputs are restricted to physical inputs including labour and capital (Yao et al, 2007) . The intermediation approach pioneered by Sealey and Lindley (1977) considers banks as an intermediary between savers and borrowers. As a result, deposits are treated as an input because they are the source of loans and investments. Neither of the two approaches is perfect as each only addresses one side of the role played by banks. In practice, both approaches are used as complementarities to each other.
In this study, we adopt the intermediation approach that treats bank deposits as an input while interest income as an output. The output variables include (1) Total Earning Assets = Loans + Other Earning Assets (including Short-term Investments, Long-term Investments, Deposits with Central Banks, Other Investments, etc.) and (2) Interest Incomes. The input variables include (1) Number of Employees, (2) Fixed Assets and (3) Deposits. As data for the number of employees is seldom disclosed and other resources cannot be used as a substitute, missing values will be estimated in accordance with the change of Total Assets (Liu and Song, 2004; Wang and Tan, 2007 Regulatory Commission (CBRC), and annual reports of banks.
Efficiency Comparison before and after IPO
We first apply the input-oriented CCR model and summarise the results in Table 5 . State-owned Joint-equity City Banks Total Banks
As for scale efficiency, the CCR model reported that all 27 DMUs of SOBs displayed DRS, while for JEBs and city commercial banks, more than 60% of DMUs presented IRS, in line with some earlier studies (Yao et al. 2008a) . To exclude the effect of scale economies on bank efficiency, the following runs a VRS model based on BCC.
The BCC model estimates banks' PTE without the influence of scale economy. After removing the negative impact of scale diseconomy, the overall efficiency of Chinese commercial banks increased sharply to 0.82. Meanwhile, 23 DMUs realized full efficiency by this measure, representing almost 20% of the sample. In particular, the entire SOBs' efficiency scores are "1" in 2007. Under VRS estimation, the average efficiency score of SOBs increased by almost 30% while this ratio for JEBs is just 6%.
The efficiency gap between the two groups is greatly reduced. Compared with the previous 30% efficiency deficit, the mean efficiency of SOBs is now just 3% lower than that of JEBs, suggesting that the main source of SOB inefficiency comes from diseconomy of scale. Despite continued improvement of their productivity and profitability, large overhead expenses due to overstaffing and an extensive network of branches make SOBs' overall efficiency inferior to JEBs. State-owned Joint-equity City Banks Total Banks Table 6 compares the VRS efficiency score before and after IPO. The results are not dissimilar to those obtained from the CCR model. The efficiency of ten banks was enhanced after stock listing. For the banks listed on the stock exchanges earlier, such as PDB and CMINB, their efficiencies decreased slightly after IPO. This might have been due to the inactive role the stock market played in the overall financial sector during that period. As the highest possible efficiency score is one, it is impossible to detect any efficiency improvement of a particular bank whose efficiency score was 20 already unitary after IPO. To overcome this limitation, it is necessary to employ the CRS and VRS super-efficiency models in the next section. 
Results of Super-efficiency Measurement
The super-efficiency model provides the same efficiency scores for those inefficient DMUs while generates higher than "1" efficiency scores for those efficient DMUs estimated by the traditional DEA. Such measurement enlarges the estimated efficiency differences and makes the efficiency comparison among DMUs more straightforward. Table 7 lists the super-efficiency scores with a VRS assumption. On average, the overall efficiency is improved by 10% assuming VRS and by 6% assuming CRS after listing. For SOBs, their higher efficiency scores are mainly attributed to increased PTE rather than scale economies. The efficiency of Ningbo Bank was raised by 2% assuming CRS but reduced by 1% assuming VRS after IPO.
These controversial results suggest that stock listing may improve efficiency in two ways. IPO can improve banks' PTE by imposing more pressure on their operations and helps banks realize their scale economy by making public funding sources more accessible. The above empirical results show a positive effect of stock listing on bank efficiency based on DEA. However, we have not been able to explain why these efficiency improvements have taken place. This question needs to be answered in the following section where a regression analysis will be conducted to identify the key determinants of efficiency scores.
Determinant of Banks Efficiency
Bank efficiency can be influenced by various factors, both internal and external. Five variables are included in the following regression analysis, ownership, return on asset (ROA), the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans (LLR/TL), stock listing, and time 22 capturing natural technological progress. 7 The dependent variable is the efficiency scores derived with different assumptions from the previous section. The regression results are presented in Table 8 . Three variables, ownership, IPO, and ROA, are found to have significant effects on efficiency. The negative sign of 'ownership' means that on average, JEBs are the most efficient banks, 12.2% more efficient than SOBs and 24.4% more efficient than city commercial banks. The sign and size of the coefficient on IPO implies that stock listing can improve bank efficiency by 8%, ceteris paribus. Two financial ratios measuring profitability (ROA) and asset quality (LLR/TL) are shown to have a positive impact on efficiency although the coefficient on LLR/TL (loan loss reserves to total loans) is not significant statistically. A higher ROA ratio means that banks could generate more profits for certain assets and hence more efficient. The LLR/TL ratio reflects the financial strength of banks. A higher ratio means that banks are exposed to lower level of credit risk and thus are expected to be more efficient.
Conclusion Remarks
After a series of bank reforms, Chinese reformers adopted privatization through stock (Yao and Luo, 2008c) . If this is the case, the effect of IPO on bank efficiency may need more time to be testified. However, the preliminary results in this paper based on the data before the stock market crash provide indisputable evidence of efficiency improvement. As a result, we conclude that IPO is an effective way to raise bank efficiency with a caution that further research needs to be done as more data become available. 
